The Philolinguist

Why is the Problem of Evil a Problem?

2010-05-23T05:28:00.000-07:00

This article has been published in The Philosopher (Journal of the Philosophical Society of England), Volume LXXXXVII No. 1, available online here.

Abstract: 'The classic Problem of Evil (henceforth referred to as 'the Problem') is one of the oldest and most persistent puzzles in philosophy. In its various formulations, the Problem posits an apparent contradiction between the existence of evil in the world and the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient and morally perfect Creator (henceforth called 'God'). The conventional proposed solutions to the Problem (such as appeals to free will, limitations on human knowledge, or 'best of all possible worlds' arguments) have been mired in inconclusive debates. This article aims to foreground some of the key assumptions that render the Problem 'problematic'; and signpost a few 'pseudo-problems' along the way.'

The DIY Prison: Why Cults Work

2010-05-23T04:54:00.001-07:00

This PDF ebook is available here.

Abstract: 'Cults are potentially harmful for what they do rather than their beliefs. They are groups that use psychological manipulation to exert a high degree of control over members. Involvement in a cult may disrupt a member's education, career, finances, social life or family ties. Extreme cults are able to persuade members to cause harm or break the law. This article aims to raise awareness of these dangers. The 'warning signs' of cult activity are outlined, along with advice on how to help cult members and ex-members. The aim is not to cast judgement on particular groups, but to help readers make well-informed decisions for themselves.'

Making Sense of Family Resemblance

2010-05-23T04:50:00.000-07:00

Download this working paper as a pdf here

Abstract: 'In this paper, I suggest that Wittgenstein's remarks on family resemblance leaves one form of essentialism entirely unscathed. Wittgenstein's arguments hinge on our apparent inability to consciously identify or describe necessary and sufficient properties common to all instantiations of a particular concept such as 'game'. In the Investigations, he argues “Don't say: “There must be something common, or they would not be called 'games'” - but look and see whether there is anything common to all. -- For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that. To repeat: don't think, but look!” (my italics). His central 'look and see' argument fails to address the possibility that the commonalities referred to may only be discernable subconsciously. The 'look and see' objection is simply irrelevant to those essentialist arguments that appeal to the demonstrated ability of the subconscious mind to grasp subtle and complex distinctions which escape conscious attention.'

The Gestural Theory of Language Origin: Philosophical Implications?

2010-05-23T04:44:00.000-07:00

Download this working paper as a pdf here.

Abstract: 'While researching this topic, I came across a paper by Robert Allott (2003) discussing the issues that I intended to cover. His paper goes into greater technical detail in both the philosophical and scientific sections, and is more wide-ranging in covering developments in philosophy, linguistics, psychology and neurology. The ideas in Allott's paper may interest a wider readership, and I have taken the liberty of writing this short non-technical piece foregrounding what I believe to be a key theme in his paper, philosophical implications of the gestural theory of language origin. The theory presents an opportunity for mutually fruitful collaboration between language origin research and the philosophy of language.'

15 of the Most Common Mistakes in Philosophy Term Papers (And How to Avoid Them)

2008-05-16T04:37:00.000-07:00

This entry has been moved here.

Egotism and the Private Language Argument

2007-01-29T01:21:00.000-08:00

This post has been published as an article in The Philosopher (Journal of the Philosophical Society of England), Volume LXXXXV No. 2, available online here.

Abstract: 'Egotism is the view that other people don't matter, except as a means to my own ends. A familiar argument for egotism is as follows: The only pain I have reason to end is the pain I feel, the sole reason being my sensation of the pain; so I have no reason to end pain I don't feel (i.e., someone else's pain). This 'experiential' argument makes egotism a default position for those who believe the argument, in the absence of a countervailing rationale for altruism (the view that other people matter, to some extent, as ends in themselves).

Egotism prescribes doing as much as I can to avoid my own suffering, even at the expense of others. This attitude can, of course, give rise to cooperative behaviour for egoistic ends, but egoistic cooperation tends to break down under the strain of free-riding and non-compliance, and generally excludes the weak. Is the experiential argument valid? From a Wittgensteinean perspective, it isn't; because my sensation of pain is not itself a reason to do anything. To begin with, reasons require justifications."