Making Sense of Family Resemblance

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Abstract: 'In this paper, I suggest that Wittgenstein's remarks on family resemblance leaves one form of essentialism entirely unscathed. Wittgenstein's arguments hinge on our apparent inability to consciously identify or describe necessary and sufficient properties common to all instantiations of a particular concept such as 'game'. In the Investigations, he argues “Don't say: “There must be something common, or they would not be called 'games'” - but look and see whether there is anything common to all. -- For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that. To repeat: don't think, but look!” (my italics). His central 'look and see' argument fails to address the possibility that the commonalities referred to may only be discernable subconsciously. The 'look and see' objection is simply irrelevant to those essentialist arguments that appeal to the demonstrated ability of the subconscious mind to grasp subtle and complex distinctions which escape conscious attention.'