Egotism and the Private Language Argument

This post has been published as an article in The Philosopher (Journal of the Philosophical Society of England), Volume LXXXXV No. 2, available online here.

Abstract: 'Egotism is the view that other people don't matter, except as a means to my own ends. A familiar argument for egotism is as follows: The only pain I have reason to end is the pain I feel, the sole reason being my sensation of the pain; so I have no reason to end pain I don't feel (i.e., someone else's pain). This 'experiential' argument makes egotism a default position for those who believe the argument, in the absence of a countervailing rationale for altruism (the view that other people matter, to some extent, as ends in themselves).

Egotism prescribes doing as much as I can to avoid my own suffering, even at the expense of others. This attitude can, of course, give rise to cooperative behaviour for egoistic ends, but egoistic cooperation tends to break down under the strain of free-riding and non-compliance, and generally excludes the weak. Is the experiential argument valid? From a Wittgensteinean perspective, it isn't; because my sensation of pain is not itself a reason to do anything. To begin with, reasons require justifications."